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Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive in which Alice wishes to commit a
secret bit to Bob. Perfectly secure bit commitment between two mistrustful parties is impossible
through asynchronous exchange of quantum information. Perfect security is however possible when
Alice and Bob each split into several agents exchanging classical information at times and locations
suitably chosen to satisfy specific relativistic constraints. In this Letter we first revisit a previously
proposed scheme [1] that realizes bit commitment using only classical communication. We prove
that the protocol is secure against quantum adversaries for a duration limited by the light-speed
communication time between the locations of the agents. We then propose a novel multi-round
scheme based on finite-field arithmetic that extends the commitment time beyond this limit, and we
prove its security against classical attacks. Finally, we present an implementation of these protocols
using dedicated hardware and we demonstrate a 2 ms-long bit commitment over a distance of 131 km.
By positioning the agents on antipodal points on the surface of the Earth, the commitment time
could possibly be extended to 212 ms.
Bit commitment is a fundamental primitive with sev-
eral applications such as coin tossing [2], secure voting [3],
contract signing or honesty-preserving auctions [4]. In a
bit commitment protocol, Alice commits a secret bit to
Bob which she can choose to reveal some time later. Se-
curity here means that if Alice is honest, then her bit is
perfectly concealed from Bob until she decides to open
the commitment and reveal her bit. Furthermore, if Bob
is honest, then it should be impossible for Alice to change
her mind once the commitment is made. That is, the only
bit she can unveil is the one she originally committed her-
self to. Information-theoretically secure bit commitment
in a setting where the two mistrustful parties exchange
classical messages in an asynchronous fashion is impossi-
ble. An extensive amount of work was devoted to study
asynchronous quantum bit commitment, for which per-
fect security was ultimately shown to be impossible [5–
8]. Note however that arbitrarily long commitments are
possible if one makes the assumption that the quantum
memory of the dishonest party is bounded [9, 10] or
noisy [11, 12].
Alternatively, bit commitment with split agents ex-
changing classical information was proposed as early as
1988 [13]. Security against classical attacks was proved
under the condition that no communication was pos-
sible between some of the agents. This protocol was
later simplified [1], and the new scheme called simplified-
BGKW, sBGKW [13] was proven secure against classical and
a restricted class of quantum attacks. The possibility
of enforcing the no-communication condition using rela-
tivistic constraints on the timing of the classical com-
munication was formulated in [14]. This later led to
the proposal of relativistic protocols based on the ex-
change of quantum and classical information [15, 16],
which were proved to be secure against quantum ad-
versaries [17, 18]. Such protocols were experimentally
demonstrated recently [19, 20]. However, the commit-
ment time achievable using these protocols is fundamen-
tally bounded by half the time required to send light
signals between the remote agents, i.e. at most ∼ 21 ms
if they are constrained to be on the surface of the Earth.
The possibility of extending the commitment to an ar-
bitrary duration was proposed in 1999 [14]. It relies on
positioning one agent of Alice A1 near an agent of Bob B1
at an agreed upon location, and similarly agents A2 and
B2 at another location. Carefully timed classical com-
munication between Ai and Bi allows Alice to commit
to a bit that she later reveals at a time of her choosing.
This requires several rounds of communication, and the
amount of communication increases exponentially with
the number of rounds making it impractical. This limi-
tation was later mitigated, at least in principle, using a
compression scheme that requires only a constant com-
munication rate [21]. Security argument against clas-
sical adversaries presented in Ref. [21] is of asymptotic
nature and, therefore, not sufficient for implementation
purposes.
In this Letter, we first revisit the sBGKW bit commit-
ment protocol [1] that uses classical communication only.
We show that successful cheating is equivalent to winning
a non-local game analyzed in Ref. [22], thereby proving
the security of this protocol against quantum adversaries.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first entirely
classical protocol to be proven secure against arbitrary
quantum adversaries. To extend the duration of the
commitment beyond the communication time between
the locations of the agents (which constitutes the rela-
tivistic constraint in the sBGKW scheme), we introduce a
novel multi-round scheme based on finite-field arithmetic
and we prove its security against classical adversaries.
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2Our scheme is simple and efficient and the security ar-
gument leads to a natural, algebraic problem for which
we prove explicit and quantitative bounds (see Propo-
sition B.2 in the Supplemental Material (SM)). Finally,
we present practical implementations of both the sBGKW
scheme and the multi-round variant, and show how this
could be used to realize commitments of duration reach-
ing up to ∼ 212 milliseconds.
Security definition We take n ∈ N to be the security
parameter and we interpret n-bit strings as elements of
the finite field F2n (for compactness we write 0 to denote
0n = 00 . . . 0). We denote addition by “⊕” (in this case
it is just the bitwise XOR) and multiplication by “∗”.
Moreover, if d is a bit and b is an n-bit string then we
define
d · b =
{
0 if d = 0,
b if d = 1.
All secret strings used in the protocol are chosen uni-
formly at random from {0, 1}n.
Let Alice (who makes the commitment) and Bob (who
receives the commitment) have agents at two distinct lo-
cations (A1 and B1 at Location 1; A2 and B2 at Loca-
tion 2) and let d ∈ {0, 1} be the bit that honest Alice
wants to commit to. The protocol consists of multiple
rounds which alternate between the two locations and the
timing is chosen such that every two consecutive rounds
are space-like separated. Hence, no message sent during
a certain round from one location can reach the other
location in time for the next round.
Security for honest Alice is quantified by Bob’s ability
to guess her commitment immediately before the open
phase (assuming he might deviate arbitrarily from the
honest protocol). All the protocols considered in this
paper are perfectly hiding, which means that Bob re-
mains completely ignorant about Alice’s commitment
(his guessing probability equals 12 ).
Security for honest Bob is quantified through a scenario
in which Alice performs an arbitrary action in the com-
mit phase and is immediately after challenged to open
one of the bits. Given a particular strategy adopted by
Alice in the commit phase we define pd to be the optimal
probability of successfully unveiling d. The protocol is
ε-binding if
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + ε
for all strategies of dishonest Alice in the commit phase.
Note that this is a weak, non-composable definition of
security. In Appendix C we discuss how to formalize
these definitions in the relativistic setting. (For a general
overview see Ref. [17].)
Security of the sBGKW scheme We now present the
scheme proposed in Ref. [1] and we prove its security
against quantum adversaries. Before the protocol begins
A1 and A2 must share a secret n-bit string a. Note that
B1 also needs a secret string b but it can be generated
before or during the protocol. The protocol consists of
two rounds:
1. (commit) B1 sends b to A1. A1 returns (d · b) ⊕ a
to B1.
2. (open) A1 unveils the committed bit d to B1 while
A2 sends a to B2.
To check whether the commitment should be accepted
B1 and B2 need to communicate (e.g. through an au-
thenticated channel) and verify that the string returned
by A1 in the commit phase equals (d · b)⊕ a.
Security for honest Alice comes from the fact that the
only message that Bob receives in the commit phase is a
uniformly random string.
Security for honest Bob in the classical case is fairly
intuitive: in order for A2 to be able to unveil both com-
mitments she would need to know both a and a⊕b, hence,
she would know b. However, since b is chosen uniformly
at random by Bob this must be difficult. This argument
can be made rigorous [1] to show that the protocol is
ε-binding for ε = 2−n (and this is actually tight: the
trivial strategy of always outputting 0 gives p0 = 1 and
p1 = 2
−n). Unfortunately, this reasoning does not work
against quantum adversaries since A2 could have two dis-
tinct measurements that reveal a and a⊕ b, respectively,
but since they could be incompatible this would not have
direct implications on her ability to guess b.
To find an explicit bound on p0+p1 we formulate cheat-
ing as a non-local game in which A1 receives b, A2 re-
ceives d (the bit she is required to unveil) and the XOR
of their outputs is supposed to equal d · b. Winning such
a game with probability pwin corresponds to a cheating
strategy that achieves p0 + p1 = 2pwin. More concisely,
the rules of the non-local game are [1]:
1. A1 receives b ∈ {0, 1}n, A2 receives d ∈ {0, 1} (both
chosen uniformly at random).
2. A1 outputs a1 ∈ {0, 1}n, A2 outputs a2 ∈ {0, 1}n
and they win iff a1 ⊕ a2 = d · b.
This game has been considered in Ref. [22] under the
name CHSHn and it has been shown that
pwin(n) ≤ 1
2
+
1√
2n+1
,
which is sufficient for our purposes as it implies that
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 +
√
2 · 2−n/2
for all strategies of dishonest Alice. Therefore, the proto-
col is ε-binding with ε = 2(1−n)/2 decaying exponentially
in n (but note that the decay rate is half of the decay
rate against classical adversaries).
The two-round protocol is mapped onto a non-local
game precisely because of the assumption of no commu-
nication. More specifically, we require that A1 outputs
the answer outside of the future of A2 receiving the input
and vice versa.
3A new multi-round protocol To extend the commit-
ment time we propose a multi-round protocol and prove
its security against classical adversaries. In principle, the
commitment time can be made arbitrarily long. However,
security depends on the number of rounds of the proto-
col, which is proportional to the length of the commit-
ment. Therefore, the longer the commitment, the more
resources (randomness and communication bandwidth)
are required to achieve a given level of security.
Suppose that Alice and Bob want to execute the pro-
tocol with m + 1 rounds and we use k as a label for the
round under consideration. Then A1 and A2 must share
m secret strings denoted by {ak}mk=1. Similarly, Bob’s
agents need one secret string for every round denoted by
{bk}mk=1 but, again, these can be generated locally dur-
ing the protocol. All the rounds before the open phase
(1 ≤ k ≤ m) have the same communication pattern: first
Bi sends an n-bit string to Ai and then she replies with
another n-bit string. In the last round Ai sends Bi a
bit (her commitment) and an n-bit string (proof of her
commitment). We will denote the n-bit string announced
by Bob (Alice) in the k round by xk (yk) regardless of
whether he/she is honest or not. The protocol is:
1. (commit, k = 1) B1 sends x1 = b1 to A1. A1
returns y1 = d · x1 ⊕ a1.
2. (sustain, 2 ≤ k ≤ m) Bi sends xk = bk to Ai. Ai
returns yk = (xk ∗ ak−1)⊕ ak.
3. (open, k = m + 1) Ai sends d and ym+1 = am to
Bi.
To check whether the commitment should be accepted B1
and B2 communicate and verify the following relation:
ym+1 = ym ⊕ bm ∗ ym−1 ⊕ bm ∗ bm−1 ∗ ym−2 ⊕ . . .
. . . ⊕ bm ∗ bm−1 ∗ . . . ∗ b2 ∗ y1 ⊕ d · bm ∗ bm−1 ∗ . . . ∗ b1.
Security for honest Alice is a direct consequence of the
fact that every message she announces is masked by a
fresh secret n-bit string, which implies that the tran-
scripts corresponding to d = 0 and d = 1 are statistically
indistinguishable (see Proposition C.1 in the SM).
Proving security for honest Bob is a more challenging
task, because we require security immediately after round
k = 1. We first state the main result and then outline
the idea behind the proof (for details refer to Sections
B.2 and C.2 in the SM). The multi-round protocol with
m + 1 rounds is ε-binding for ε = cm defined as
cm =
{
2−n for m = 1,
1
2n+1 +
√
cm−1 for m ≥ 2. (1)
The security argument is conceptually simple: in the
classical scenario the sequential cheating game in the
multi-round protocol is equivalent to a game in which
multiple players act in parallel which allows us to dis-
regard the causal structure of the protocol. We show
that cheating in a protocol with m+ 1 rounds is at least
as difficult as winning the following m-player game. Let
X1, X2, . . . , Xm be independent random variables drawn
uniformly from the set of n-bit strings {0, 1}n and the k
player receives all the variables except for Xk and out-
puts an n-bit string. The game is won if the XOR of the
outputs equals X1 ∗ X2 ∗ . . . ∗ Xm. The bounds we ob-
tain decay exponentially in n/2m. This means that they
become significantly weaker as the number of players in-
creases, which ultimately limits the maximum number of
rounds that can be implemented in practice. The tight-
ness of these bounds is an interesting open problem and it
is briefly discussed in Appendix B. Note that no explicit
cheating strategy is known, whose winning probability
would approach our security bounds.
Implementation We implemented the two-round and
the multi-round protocols described above. Each party
has agents at two distinct locations: one at the Group
of Applied Physics of the University of Geneva and one
at the Institute of Applied Physics of the University of
Berne. The straight-line distance between the two loca-
tions is s = 131 km, corresponding to a time separation
of 437 µs. The hardware installed in Geneva is concep-
tually represented in FIG. 1(a) and identical to the one
in Berne. Each of the classical agents is a standalone
computer equipped with a field-programmable gate ar-
ray (FPGA) programmed to execute the necessary steps
of the protocol. Each FPGA is synchronized to the Co-
ordinated Universal Time (UTC) via a Global Position-
ing System clock (GPS clock), which consists of a GPS
receiver and a Oven-Controlled Quartz-Crystal Oscilla-
tor (OCXO) generating a 10 MHz sinusoidal waveform.
Through its GPS connection, the receiver outputs one
electronic pulse per second (PPS), which is used to dis-
cipline the OCXO. The receiver is locked to the GPS
signal with a time accuracy better than 150 ns. The
10 MHz signal generated by the OCXO is fed into the
FPGA board and it is used to generate a 125 MHz sig-
nal using a phase-locked loop. This 125 MHz signal then
serves as the time basis for the computations performed
on the FPGA. The FPGA also receives the PPS signal
to monitor the synchronization with the GPS clock. In
particular, the number of cycles between two successive
PPS signals is confirmed to be 125 × 106 plus or minus
one, where each cycle corresponds to 8 ns. Therefore, the
FPGA tolerates fluctuations up to 24 ns on the arrival
time of the PPS synchronization signal. The GPS clock
also provides the FPGA with a universal time stamp of
every PPS signal, allowing Alice and Bob to locate their
actions in time.
Before either the two-round or the multi-round proto-
col starts, A1 and A2 (and similarly B1 and B2) share
an appropriate number of random n-bit strings. At time
t1, which was agreed upon by both parties, B1 sends the
random string x1 through the optical link. For a string
of 512 bits communicated through the 2.5 Gbps optical
link, this requires 205 ns. A1’s FPGA then computes the
string y1 and sends it to B1; see FIG. 1(b). The rela-
tivistic constraint requires space-like separation between
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FIG. 1. (a) Experimental setup. (b) Space-time diagram of
the experimental setup.
every two consecutive rounds, which means that the en-
tire second round must be outside of the future light cone
of the first bit of x1 leaving the FPGA of B1. The com-
mitment begins when the last bit of y1 is recorded by the
FPGA of B1. With n = 512 bits, the security parameter
of the two-round protocol is ε ≈ 10−77.
In the two-round protocol, A2 unveils the commitment
in the second round, at time t2 = t1+∆t. She does so by
sending the string a1 to B2, along with the committed
bit d. B2 checks that the last bit of a1 is received outside
the future light cone of the beginning of the protocol. If
this is the case, B2 communicates a1 and d to B1 through
an authenticated channel. Finally, B1 verifies that y1 ⊕
a1 = d·x1 and accepts the commitment. If the relativistic
constraint is not respected, or if B1’s verification fails, the
protocol aborts.
In the multi-round protocol, A1 and A2 successively
sustain the commitment until the last round. All rounds
(except the first and last rounds) proceed as follows.
Let us consider the kth round, with k even (odd rounds
are similar). Between rounds k and k − 2, the string
xk is loaded in the memory of B2’s FPGA, and strings
ak−1 and ak are loaded in A2’s FPGA. At time tk =
t1 + (k− 1)∆t, B2 communicates xk through the optical
link. Then A2 sustains the commitment by computing
yk with the FPGA and sending it to B2. The time be-
tween the communication of xk and the reception of yk
is 6.1 µs. B2 checks that the reception of yk is outside
the future light cone of the beginning of the communica-
tion between B1 to A1 that happened in round k−1. We
used ∆t = 400 µs (see Fig. 1), which is 37 µs shorter than
the light-speed separation between the Berne and Geneva
locations. Considering the 6.1 µs, the absolute inaccura-
cies of the GPS clock (≤ 150 ns), and the tolerance in the
fluctuations of the synchronization signals (≤ 24 ns) the
round is completed ≈ 30.7 µs before the relativistic con-
straint expires. In the final (m + 1)th round, A1 (or A2)
opens the commitment at time tm+1 by sending the string
am+1 along with the committed bit d. To verify the com-
mitment, B2 sends to B1 all the strings communicated
by A2 through an authenticated channel. B1 then checks
if the commitment should be accepted as outlined above.
Authentication is based on an information-theoretic se-
cure message-authenticator code which consists of a com-
bination of polynomial hashing, and a strongly-universal
family of hash functions [23].
In the multi-round scheme, we aimed to maximize the
number of rounds with a reasonable value for the se-
curity parameter ε. The limit of n = 512 bits and
m+ 1 = 6 rounds was ultimately set by the performance
that we could achieve with the FPGA at our disposal.
This yields a security parameter of ε ≈ 2.3 × 10−10.
Using these parameters, we realized a commitment of
2 ms duration, which extends beyond the 437 µs limit of
the two-round protocol. Because synchronizing rounds
over longer durations is a simple task for our hardware,
it is straightforward to achieve significantly longer com-
mitment times using more distant agents. For example,
150 ms could be easily achieved using Geneva and Sin-
gapore as the locations (these locations were used in our
previous demonstration of quantum-relativistic bit com-
mitment [19]), while 212 ms could be achieved using an-
tipodal locations on the Earth.
Summary We have shown that classical relativistic
protocols allow us to implement information-theoretically
secure commitment schemes in a straightforward fashion.
The commitment scheme we implemented belongs to
the class of timed commitments, i.e. commitments that
expire after a certain period of time. Even though they
cannot be used to implement primitives whose security is
required to hold forever (e.g. oblivious transfer), they are
known to have other important applications, e.g. contract
signing, honesty-preserving auctions or secure voting [3,
4] (see also Appendix A).
For the sBGKW scheme we obtain an explicit, quantita-
tive security bound by making a connection to a non-local
game analyzed previously. We also propose a multi-round
scheme which is secure against classical adversaries. We
note that the number of rounds that we implemented
here could have been higher using better optimized hard-
ware. However, the scaling of the security bound with the
number of rounds (1) prohibits a much larger number
of rounds. An important problem is therefore to find a
multi-round protocol whose security exhibits better scal-
ing with the number of rounds, or, ideally, no dependence
at all. This would allow us to obtain longer (or maybe
even arbitrarily long) commitments while only using sim-
ple, commercially available digital devices.
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Appendix A: Preliminaries
1. How useful is a relativistic bit commitment protocol?
The commitment scheme we implement belongs to the class of timed commitments, i.e. commitments that are only
valid for a period of time but then ultimately expire. Such commitments cannot be used in reductions implementing
primitives whose security is required to hold forever (e.g. oblivious transfer or secure function evaluation) but they are
known to have other applications. For example, Boneh and Naor [4] study commitments which after some fixed ∆t
automatically open, i.e. the committed value is revealed. They show that such commitments can be used for contract
signing or honesty-preserving auctions. In our case after ∆t the commitment simply vanishes, i.e. Bob should not
accept any opening (because Alice could unveil either bit with unit probability) and the originally committed value
(if there was one) remains secret. Therefore, it gives more power to the committer by giving her the freedom not to
open the commitment and, hence, protect her privacy. Generally speaking, such temporary secrecy is sufficient if the
goal is not to preserve secrecy forever but to force parties to act simultaneously (in the sense that their respective
actions should not depend on each other) even if the communication model is sequential. Our commitment might be
particularly useful for multi-party protocols which are robust against a certain fraction of dishonest parties (then we
would simply call dishonest any party that refuses to open the commitment). A prime application of this type would
be the task of secure voting as presented in Ref. [3].
62. Notation
Let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Generally, we use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase letters to denote
particular values. For j, k ∈ S we use ∑j 6=k as shorthand notation for ∑j∈S∑k∈S\{j}.
3. The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for probabilities
Let X be a random variable distributed uniformly over [n] and let {Ej}j∈[m] be a family of events defined on X.
Lemma A.1. Let p be the average probability of the family of events
p :=
1
m
∑
j∈[m]
Pr[Ej ]
and c be the cumulative size of the pairwise intersections
c :=
∑
j 6=k
Pr[Ej ∧ Ek].
Then the following inequality holds
p ≤ 1 +
√
1 + 4c
2m
.
Proof. Each event can be represented by an n-dimensional, real vector whose entries are labelled by the possible values
that X can take. If a particular value of X belongs to the event, we set the corresponding component to 1/
√
n and
if it does not we set it to 0
[sj ]x =
{
1√
n
if x ∈ Ej ,
0 otherwise.
Moreover, let n be the normalised, uniform vector: [n]x = 1/
√
n for all x ∈ [n]. It is straightforward to check that
with these definitions we have
Pr[Ej ] = 〈sj , n〉 = 〈sj , sj〉 and Pr[Ej ∧ Ek] = 〈sj , sk〉.
Clearly, we have 〈sj , sk〉 ≥ 0. Due to linearity of the inner product we have
p =
1
m
∑
j∈[m]
Pr[Ej ] =
1
m
∑
j
〈sj , n〉 = 1
m
〈
∑
j
sj , n〉,
which can be upper bounded using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Since 〈n, n〉 = 1 we have
〈
∑
j
sj , n〉2 ≤
∑
jk
〈sj , sk〉 =
∑
j
〈sj , sj〉+
∑
j 6=k
〈sj , sk〉 = mp + c,
which gives the following quadratic constraint
p2 ≤ p
m
+
c
m2
.
Solving for p gives the desired bound.
Appendix B: Finite-field multiplication in the “Number on the Forehead” model
We introduce a family of multiplayer games which are a natural generalisation of the two-player family introduced
in Ref. [24] and generalised in Ref. [25]. Since these games rely on finite-field arithmetic we first state some basic
properties of finite fields, then we define the game and show that finding the optimal winning probability corresponds
to a natural algebraic problem concerning multivariate polynomials over finite fields. Finally, we prove upper bounds
on the optimal winning probability and discuss their tightness.
7P1 P2 Pm
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FIG. 2. In the “Number on the Forehead” model there are m inputs X1, X2, . . . , Xm and Pk (the k player out of m) receives
all the inputs except for Xk. We denote the output of Pk by Yk. Vertical lines remind us that no communication between the
players is allowed.
1. Finite-field arithmetic
Let Fq denote the finite field of order q = pk (p is a prime and k is an integer) and let 0 denote the zero element of
Fq. Operations over finite-field satisfy the following properties
1. Multiplication by zero gives zero
x · 0 = 0 ∀x ∈ Fq
2. Multiplication is distributive over addition
x(y + z) = (xy) + (xz) ∀x, y, z ∈ Fq
2. Definition of the game
Consider a one-round game with m-players denoted by P1,P2, . . . ,Pm. With every player we associate an input
and an output, e.g. for Pk these are denoted by Xk and Yk, respectively. Let each of X1, X2, . . . , Xm be drawn
independently, uniformly at random from Fq. In the “Number on the Forehead” model Pk receives all the inputs
except for the k one (denoted by X[m]\{k}) as shown in FIG. 2. Each player is required to output an element of Fq
(denoted by Yk) and the game is won if
m∏
k=1
Xk =
m∑
k=1
Yk. (B1)
In the classical setting the optimal winning probability can be achieved when each player adopts a deterministic
strategy, i.e. a function f : F(m−1)q → Fq. If Pk employs a strategy represented by fk, i.e. he outputs Yk = fk(X[m]\{k}),
then the winning probability equals
ωm(f1, f2, . . . , fm) := Pr
[ m∏
k=1
Xk =
m∑
k=1
fk(X[m]\{k})
]
and we define ωm to be the optimal winning probability
ωm := max
f1,f2,...,fm
ωm(f1, f2, . . . , fm), (B2)
where the maximisation is taken over all functions from F(m−1)q to Fq.
3. Characterisation through multivariate polynomials over a finite field
First, note that since the probability distribution of inputs is uniform then the winning probability is proportional
to the number of inputs (x1, x2, . . . , xm) on which the condition (B1) is satisfied
m∏
k=1
xk =
m∑
k=1
fk(x[m]\{k}).
8Alternatively, the winning probability can be deduced by counting the number of zeroes of the following function
P (x1, x2, . . . , xm) =
m∏
k=1
xk −
m∑
k=1
fk(x[m]\{k}).
By the Lagrange interpolation method every function from Fnq → Fq (for arbitrary n ∈ N) can be written as a
polynomial. Therefore, the question concerns the number of zeroes of the polynomial P . Different strategies employed
by the players give rise to different polynomials and we need to characterise what polynomials are “reachable” in this
model. The output of Pk is an arbitrary polynomial of x[m]\{k}, hence, it only contains terms that depend on at
most m − 1 variables. This means that the part of P that depends on all m variables comes solely from the first
term and equals
∏m
k=1 xk. Therefore, finding the optimal winning probability of the game is equivalent to finding the
polynomial with the largest number of zeroes, whose only term that depends on all m variables equals
∏m
k=1 xk. This
reduces the problem of finding the optimal strategy to a purely algebraic problem about properties of polynomials
over finite fields.
4. A recursive upper bound on the optimal winning probability
Here, we show how to find explicit upper bounds on ωm through an induction argument. First, note that for m = 1
there is only one term on the right-hand side of Eq. (B1) and since this term takes no arguments it is actually a
constant. Since X1 is uniform we have
ω1 := max
c∈Fq
Pr[X1 = c] =
1
q
.
Now, we show how to prove an upper bound on ωm in terms of ωm−1. For a fixed strategy {f1, f2, . . . , fm} the
winning probability can be written as
ωm(f1, f2, . . . , fm) = Pr
[
X1X2 . . . Xm =
m∑
k=1
fk(X[m]\{k})
]
=
∑
y∈Fq
Pr[Xm = y] · Pr
[
X1X2 . . . Xm =
m∑
k=1
fk(X[m]\{k})|Xm = y
]
= q−1
∑
y
Pr
[
X1X2 . . . Xm =
m∑
k=1
fk(X[m]\{k})|Xm = y
]
.
Conditioning on a particular value of Xm leads to events that only depend on X1, X2, . . . , Xm−1. In particular, we
can define for Xm = y the event Fy
Fy ⇐⇒ X1X2 . . . Xm−1y =
m−1∑
k=1
fk(X[m−1]\{k}, y) + fm(X[m−1]),
which satisfies
Pr[Fy] = Pr
[
X1X2 . . . Xm =
m∑
k=1
fk(X[m]\{k})|Xm = y
]
. (B3)
We can use Lemma A.1 to find a bound on ωm(f1, f2, . . . , fm) = q−1
∑
y Pr[Fy] as long as we are given bounds on
Pr[Fy ∧ Fz] for y 6= z.
Proposition B.1. For y 6= z we have Pr[Fy ∧ Fz] ≤ ωm−1.
Proof. Eq. (B3) defines Fy through a certain equation in the finite field. If the equations corresponding to Fy and Fz
are satisfied simultaneously then clearly any linear combination of these equations is also satisfied. More specifically,
we define a new event
Gyz ⇐⇒ X1X2 . . . Xm−1(y − z) =
m−1∑
k=1
fk(X[m−1]\{k}, y)− fk(X[m−1]\{k}, z) (B4)
9and since Fy ∧ Fz =⇒ Gyz we are guaranteed that Pr[Fy ∧ Fz] ≤ Pr[Gyz].
To find an upper bound on Pr[Gyz] we give the players more power by allowing a more general expression on the
right-hand side. In Eq. (B4) the k term is a function of X[m−1]\{k}, y and z, so let us replace it by an arbitrary
function of these variables
fk(X[m−1]\{k}, y)− fk(X[m−1]\{k}, z) → gk(X[m−1]\{k}, y, z).
Under this relaxation, we arrive at the following equality
X1X2 . . . Xm−1(y − z) =
m−1∑
k=1
gk(X[m−1]\{k}, y, z).
Clearly, (y− z) is a constant (non-zero) multiplicative factor known to each player. Dividing the equation through by
(y − z) leads to the same game as considered before but the number of players has decreased by one: there are only
m− 1 players now. Therefore,
Pr[Fy ∧ Fz] ≤ Pr[Gyz] ≤ ωm−1.
Now, we can state and prove our main technical result.
Proposition B.2. The optimal winning probability of the game defined in (B2) satisfies the following recursive
relation
ωm ≤ 1 +
√
1 + 4q(q − 1)ωm−1
2q
. (B5)
Proof. The statement follows directly from combining Lemma A.1 with Proposition B.1.
Since we know that ω1 = q−1, we can obtain a bound on ωm by recursive evaluation of Eq. (B5). More precisely,
we get ωm ≤ cm for
cm =
{
q−1 for m = 1,
1+
√
1+4q(q−1)cm−1
2q for m ≥ 2.
(B6)
Note that this bound is always non trivial, i.e. cm < 1 for all values of q and m. To obtain a slightly weaker but
simpler form presented as Eq. (1) in main text we note that 1− 4qcm−1 ≤ 0 and set q = 2n.
5. Discussion
Having proved an explicit upper bound on ωm we would like to investigate its tightness. It can be shown that in
the regime interesting from the cryptographic point of view (q  1) the leading behaviour of cm is
cm ∝ q−2−m . (B7)
In other words, cm decays exponentially in q but the value of the exponent depends on the number of players: every
time we add a player we lose half of the decay exponent. This might seem unexpectedly weak but it has recently been
shown (Theorem 6.5 in Ref. [25]) that
ω2 = Ω(q
− 23 ).
In fact, for q = pk where k is even it can be improved (Theorem 1.3 in Ref. [25]) to give
ω2 = Ω(q
− 12 ).
This shows that for m = 2 the asymptotic decay of q−1/2 is the best we can hope for (at least for an upper bound
that holds for both odd and even values of q). Moreover, as far as we know, the best explicit upper bound on ω2 is
the quantum upper bound (Theorem 1.2 in Ref. [25])
cqm2 =
1
q
+
q − 1
q
1√
q
.
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On the other hand, evaluating c2 according to Eq. (B6) gives
c2 =
√
1− 34q√
q
+
1
2q
.
By noting that √
1− 3
4q
≤ 1− 3
8q
for q ≥ 3
4
and
1√
q
− 3
8q
√
q
+
1
2q
≤ 1√
q
+
1
q
− 1
q
√
q
for q ≥ 25
16
we conclude that our bound is strictly tighter, c2 < c
qm
2 , for all q ≥ 2. (Note that since c2 only applies to classical
strategies, this comparison has no implications on the tightness of cqm2 in the quantum setting.)
To close the discussion, let us mention that the “Number on the Forehead” model has been extensively studied in
the communication complexity setting. In fact, for certain Boolean functions related to finite-field multiplication (in
finite fields of characteristic 2, i.e. q = 2n) a lower bound of the form Ω(n/2m) was recently shown [26]. As it appears
strikingly similar to (B7) it would be interesting to investigate whether the two scenarios can be related in a rigorous
way.
Appendix C: Relativistic bit commitment protocols
All the n-bit strings that appear in the protocols below should be interpreted as elements of the finite field F2n .
The addition and multiplication are denoted by ⊕ and ∗, respectively. Note that the addition is exactly the bitwise
XOR but the multiplication does not correspond to taking bitwise AND. Moreover, if d is a bit and b is an n-bit string
we define
d · b =
{
0 if d = 0,
b if d = 1.
1. Causal structure of the protocol
The relativistic protocols we consider require Alice (who makes the commitment) and Bob (who receives the
commitment) to delegate agents to exchange information at two distant locations labelled by 1 and 2. We refer to
Alice’s (Bob’s) agent at the i location by Ai (Bi). Odd (even) rounds take place at Location 1 (2) and the timing
is chosen such that every pair of consecutive rounds is space-like separated (see FIG. 3), which means that Alice’s
message in the (k + 1) round must not depend on Bob’s message in the k round and vice versa. These are the causal
constraints of the protocol and any actions that do not violate them are allowed. Note that these constraints are
strictly more restrictive than any form of no-signalling between the two locations. We will see in Section C.4 how
these constraints restrict the power of the dishonest party.
2. Security model and definitions
Here, we describe the class of cheating strategies allowed for the dishonest parties and how to quantify security for
the honest ones.
a. Honest Alice and dishonest Bob
If Alice is honest, she will make an honest commitment to d and Bob should remain completely ignorant about
d until the open phase regardless of his behaviour during the protocol (for an explanation of the phase structure of
relativistic bit commitment schemes see Ref. [17]). More specifically, we define the knowledge of Bob as the knowledge
of B1 and B2 pooled together. (To see why it is not sufficient to require that each agent remains ignorant note that if
Alice aborts the protocol immediately before the open phase we want Bob to remain ignorant about d for an indefinite
11
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FIG. 3. The protocol requires each pair of consecutive rounds to be space-like separated. Here, we show a valid space-time
arrangement for rounds (k − 1), k and (k + 1). Dots represent rounds and dashed lines represent future light cones. Clearly,
both pairs (k − 1, k) and (k, k + 1) are space-like separated.
period of time. Clearly, in this setting there is enough time for B1 and B2 to combine their knowledge.) Dishonest
Bob is limited only by the causal constraints (explained in Section C.1): the messages announced by his classical
agents may be arbitrary functions of all messages exchanged in the past (including any randomness generated before
the protocol begins available to both B1 and B2). Quantum agents are, in addition, allowed to preshare a quantum
state (of arbitrary dimension) and then throughout the protocol perform arbitrary measurements on it.
The security definition for honest Alice is based on the transcript, which contains complete information about all
the messages exchanged in the protocol at both locations and, hence, represents the combined knowledge of B1 and
B2. Since in our case all the messages are classical the transcript is just a classical random variable denoted by T .
Perfect security for Alice means that Bob should not be able to extract any information about her commitment. More
precisely, we require that the distributions of transcripts are identical (statistically indistinguishable). We say that a
protocol is perfectly hiding if
Pr[T = t|d = 0] = Pr[T = t|d = 1] ∀t
for all strategies of dishonest Bob. Note that d is not a random variable, it is Alice’s input to the protocol. Therefore,
Pr[T = t|d = 0] should be understood as the probability of seeing the transcript t given that Alice has decided to
commit to 0.
b. Honest Bob and dishonest Alice
If Bob is honest, no strategy of dishonest Alice should allow her to successfully unveil both bits with high probability.
Dishonest Alice is, again, limited only by the causal constraints: the messages she announces may be arbitrary
functions of all messages exchanged in the past (including any randomness generated before the protocol begins
available to both A1 and A2). Since we want our protocol to force Alice to become committed in the commit phase
we must show that even if Alice decides on the value of the commitment immediately after the commit phase she
will still fail. Therefore, we consider a model in which her behaviour in the commit phase must be independent of
the bit she will attempt to unveil later, denoted by d, but the messages exchanged later might depend on it. Given
a particular strategy adopted by Alice in the commit phase we define pd to be the optimal probability of successfully
unveiling d. The protocol is ε-binding if
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + ε
for all strategies of dishonest Alice in the commit phase. Note that this is a weak, non-composable definition of
security and that in some other scenarios stronger security definitions can be used [17].
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3. Security of sBGKW scheme against quantum adversaries
The protocol requires A1 and A2 to share a secret n-bit string, a ∈ {0, 1}n, chosen uniformly at random, which is
consumed in the protocol.
1. (commit) B1 sends A1 an n-bit string, b ∈ {0, 1}n, chosen uniformly at random. A1 returns d · b⊕ a to B1.
2. (open) A1 unveils to B1 the committed bit d while A2 unveils to B2 the secret string a.
3. (verify) Bob collects data from B1 and B2 and accepts the commitment iff the string returned by A1 in the
commit phase equals d · b⊕ a.
Security for honest Alice follows from the fact that the knowledge of Bob (more precisely, the knowledge of his
two agents pooled together) before the open phase is restricted to one n-bit string: the string that B1 receives in the
commit phase, which in the honest scenario equals d · b ⊕ a. It follows that as long as Alice is honest and chooses a
uniformly this string is distributed uniformly regardless of the value of her commitment.
Security for honest Bob against dishonest Alice who is restricted to classical cheating strategies is fairly intuitive:
in order for A2 to be able to unveil both commitments she would need to know both a and a⊕ b, which implies that
she would know b. However, since b is chosen uniformly at random by Bob this must be difficult. This argument can
be made rigorous [1] to show that the protocol is ε-binding for ε = 2−n (and this is actually tight: the trivial strategy
of always outputting the string of all zeroes gives p0 = 1 and p1 = 2−n). Unfortunately, this reasoning does not work
against quantum adversaries since it could be the case that A2 has two distinct measurements (one that reveals a
and another one that reveals a⊕ b) but since they are incompatible this does not imply anything about her ability to
guess b.
To find an explicit bound on p0 +p1 in the quantum setting we formulate cheating as a non-local game in which A1
receives b, A2 receives d (the bit she is required to unveil, chosen uniformly at random) and the XOR of their outputs
is supposed to equal d · b. Winning such a game with probability pwin corresponds to a cheating strategy that satisfies
p0 + p1 = 2pwin. More concisely, the rules of the non-local game are
1. A1 receives b ∈ {0, 1}n, A2 receives d ∈ {0, 1} (both chosen uniformly at random).
2. A1 outputs a1 ∈ {0, 1}n, A2 outputs a2 ∈ {0, 1}n and they win iff a1 ⊕ a2 = d · b.
This is exactly the game considered in Ref. [22] under the name CHSHn. They show that
pwin(n) ≤ 1
2
+
1√
2n+1
,
which is sufficient for our purposes as it implies that
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 +
√
2 · 2−n/2
for all strategies of dishonest Alice. Therefore, the protocol is ε-binding with ε = 2(1−n)/2 decaying exponentially in
n (but note that the decay rate is half of the decay rate against classical adversaries).
The two-round protocol gets mapped onto a non-local game precisely because of the assumption of no communi-
cation. More specifically, we require that A1 outputs the answer outside of the future of A2 receiving the input and
vice versa.
4. A new multi-round protocol based on finite-field arithmetic
The protocol presented in Section C.3 implements a bit commitment scheme that is provably secure against quantum
adversaries. Unfortunately, the commitment time is limited by s/c, where s is the spatial separation between Locations
1 and 2 and c is the speed of light. If the two sites are constrained to be on the surface of the Earth then the
commitment can only be valid for approximately 42 milliseconds. Here, we present a new, multi-round scheme which,
by adding extra intermediate rounds, allows for an arbitrarily long commitment and we prove its security against
classical adversaries. Note, however, that the security guarantee depends on the number of rounds of the protocol
(which is proportional to the length of the commitment): the longer the commitment, the more resources (randomness
and communication bandwidth) are required to achieve the same level of security.
The protocol consists of m+ 1 rounds labelled by k ∈ [m+ 1], which obey the causal structure described in Section
C.1. The commitment is initiated in the first round (k = 1), it is sustained for k = 2, 3, . . . ,m and is eventually
13
opened in the last round (k = m+ 1). Let us emphasise that we want Alice to become committed as soon as the first
round is over and if she were able to decide on the value of her commitment in the second round we would consider
that cheating. This is necessary to argue that the commitment really begins in the first round. All the rounds before
the open phase (1 ≤ k ≤ m) have the same communication pattern: first Bi sends an n-bit string to Ai and then she
replies with another n-bit string. In the last round Ai sends Bi a bit (her commitment) and an n-bit string (proof of
her commitment). We will denote the n-bit string announced by Bob (Alice) in the k round by xk (yk) regardless of
whether he/she is honest or not.
Before the protocol begins Alice generates m strings of n-bits (private from Bob), denoted by {ak}mk=1, drawn
independently, uniformly at random from {0, 1}n, and distributes them to A1 and A2. Similarly, Bob generates m
strings of n-bits (private from Alice), denoted by {bk}mk=1, drawn independently, uniformly at random from {0, 1}n,
and distributes them to B1 and B2.
The protocol goes as follows
1. (commit) In the first round B1 sends x1 = b1 to A1 and she replies with y1 = d · x1 ⊕ a1. This initiates the
commitment.
2. (sustain) In the k round (for 2 ≤ k ≤ m) Bi sends Ai the string xk = bk and she replies with yk = (xk∗ak−1)⊕ak.
3. (open) In the (m + 1) round Ai sends d and ym+1 = am to Bi.
4. (verify) Bob collects data from B1 and B2 and accepts the commitment iff the strings announced by A1 and A2
satisfy
ym+1 = ym ⊕ bm ∗ ym−1 ⊕ bm ∗ bm−1 ∗ ym−2 ⊕ . . .
. . . ⊕ bm ∗ bm−1 ∗ . . . ∗ b2 ∗ y1 ⊕ d · bm ∗ bm−1 ∗ . . . ∗ b1. (C1)
Note that the private strings of Alice and Bob as well as the messages they exchange are actually random variables
and that is how they must be treated in the analysis.
a. Correctness
It is easy to verify (by induction) that if Alice and Bob follow the protocol then the condition (C1) is satisfied for
any choice of strings {ak}mk=1 and {bk}mk=1.
b. Security for honest Alice
We start with a lemma which formalises the intuition that if we take an arbitrary random variable taking values in
a finite field and perform (finite field) addition with a uniform and uncorrelated random variable then there will be
no correlations between the input and the output (or any function thereof). More specifically, in the following lemma
Y is a random variable from which the input is generated using function g, X is the fresh (finite field) randomness
and h is a function allowing us to condition on a certain subset of values of Y .
Lemma C.1. Let X = Fq and Y,Z be arbitrary finite sets. Let X and Y be two random variables taking values in
X and Y, respectively, such that X is uniform and independent from Y
Pr[X = x, Y = y] = q−1 · Pr[Y = y], (C2)
for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. Then for arbitrary functions g : Y → X , h : Y → Z and arbitrary fixed x ∈ X , z ∈ Z it
holds that
Pr[X + g(Y ) = x |h(Y ) = z] = q−1.
Proof. Note that
Pr[X + g(Y ) = x, h(Y ) = z] =
∑
y∈Y
Pr[X = x− g(y), h(y) = z, Y = y]
=
∑
y∈Y
h(y)=z
Pr[X = x− g(y), Y = y] =
∑
y∈Y
h(y)=z
q−1 · Pr[Y = y] = q−1 · Pr[h(Y ) = z],
where the second last equality follows from applying the assumption (C2) to every term of the sum.
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Proposition C.1. If Alice is honest then the protocol is perfectly hiding.
Proof. As explained in Section C 2 a we need to show that the transcripts for d = 0 and d = 1 after m rounds
(immediately before the open phase) are indistinguishable
Pr[Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, . . . , Ym = ym|d = 0] = Pr[Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, . . . , Ym = ym|d = 1]
for all y1, y2, . . . , ym. In fact, we will show by induction that
Pr[Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, . . . , Yt = yt|d = b] = 2−nt, (C3)
for all t ∈ [m] regardless of the value of b ∈ {0, 1}, which clearly satisfies the indistinguishability condition.
Honest Alice will follow the protocol, which means that {Ak}mk=1 are drawn independently, uniformly at random
from {0, 1}n, the value of her commitment is d and then Alice’s message in k round is
Yk =
{
d ·X1 ⊕A1 for k = 1,
Yk = (Xk ∗Ak−1)⊕Ak for 2 ≤ k ≤ m. (C4)
Bob, on the other hand, is only limited by the causal constraints, which means that his message in the k round might
depend on some randomness preshared between B1 and B2, denoted by RB , and all the responses of Alice which
belong to the past of the k round. Therefore, without loss of generality his message in the k round is
Xk = fk(RB , Y1, Y2, . . . Yk−2) (C5)
for some arbitrary function fk (we include all randomness used by Bob in RB so fk is deterministic).
In this scenario the full transcript is a deterministic function of Alice’s commitment d, her private randomness
{Ak}mk=1 and Bob’s preshared randomness RB . For every string announced by Alice and Bob we can explicitly find
the subset of random variables it may depend on as listed in the table below
message random variables it might depend on
X1 RB
X2 RB
X3 d,RB , A1
...
...
Xk d,RB , A1, A2, . . . , Ak−2
...
...
Xm d,RB , A1, A2, . . . , Am−2
Y1 d,RB , A1
Y2 d,RB , A1, A2
Y3 d,RB , A1, A2, A3
...
...
Yk d,RB , A1, A2, . . . , Ak
...
...
Ym d,RB , A1, A2, . . . , Am
First, we verify that Eq. (C3) holds for t = 1
Pr[Y1 = y1|d = b] = Pr[b ·X1 ⊕A1 = y1] = Pr[b · f1(RB)⊕A1 = y1] = 2−n,
where the first two equalities follow from Eqs. (C4) and (C5), respectively. The last equality is a direct consequence
of Lemma C.1 (in a simplified form: no conditioning) applied to X = A1, Y = (b, RB), g(Y ) = b · f1(RB). Now,
suppose that Eq. (C3) holds for t = k. Then
Pr[Y1 = y1, . . . , Yk+1 = yk+1|d = b]
= Pr[Yk+1 = yk+1|d = b, Y1 = y1, . . . , Yk = yk] · Pr[Y1 = y1, . . . , Yk = yk|d = b]
= Pr[(Xk+1 ∗Ak)⊕Ak+1 = yk+1|d = b, Y1 = y1, . . . , Yk = yk] · 2−nk
= 2−n · 2−nk = 2−(n+1)k,
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where the second last inequality follows from applying Lemma C.1 to
X = Ak+1,
Y = (b, RB , A1, . . . , Ak),
g(Y ) = Xk+1 ∗Ak, (C6)
h(Y ) = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yk).
Note that it is not immediately obvious and the reader should verify (using the table presented above) that the
quantities on the right-hand side of Eq. (C6) are functions of Y alone, and therefore satisfy the assumptions of the
lemma. This shows that Eq. (C3) holds for t = k + 1 and so by induction it must hold for all t ∈ [m]. Therefore,
even just before the open phase the transcript contains no information about Alice’s commitment and the protocol is
perfectly hiding.
c. Security for honest Bob
Proposition C.2. If Bob is honest then the protocol is ε-binding for ε = ωm defined in Eq. (B2).
Proof. Honest Bob will follow the protocol so Xk = Bk, where {Bk}mk=1 are drawn independently, uniformly at random
from {0, 1}n. Let RA be any randomness preshared by A1 and A2 before the protocol begins. The most general
cheating strategy for Alice allowed by the security model described in Section C 2 b is a collection of (deterministic)
functions, {fk}m+1k=1 , all of which output an n-bit string while their inputs are as described below.
• Alice’s message in the commit phase might depend on the preshared randomness and the first message of Bob
Y1 = f1(RA, B1).
• Alice’s messages during the sustain phase (k ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,m}) might depend on the preshared randomness,
Bob’s messages from the past and the bit she is trying to unveil d
Yk = fk(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bk−2, Bk, d).
Note that Yk must not depend on Bk−1 because, by assumption, it does not belong to the past of the k round.
• Alice’s message in the open phase might depend on the preshared randomness, Bob’s messages from the past
and the bit she is trying to unveil d
Ym+1 = fm+1(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bm−1, d).
Again, Ym+1 must not depend on Bm.
The commitment to d will be accepted iff (C1) is satisfied for that value of d and let us denote this event by Hd.
By definition pd = Pr[Hd] and since both events are defined over (RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bm) it is meaningful to talk about
H0 ∨ H1 and H0 ∧ H1. (Note that this reasoning does not work in the quantum setting since H0 and H1 are not
defined simultaneously.) To bound p0 + p1 we use Pr[H0] + Pr[H1] = Pr[H0 ∨H1] + Pr[H0 ∧H1] ≤ 1 + Pr[H0 ∧H1].
The event H0 ∧H1 happens if (C1) is satisfied for both values of d. Define K to be the event that the XOR of the
two conditions (i.e. Eq. (C1) for d = 0 and d = 1) is satisfied
K ⇐⇒ B1 ∗B2 ∗ . . . ∗Bm = gm+1(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bm−1)⊕ gm(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bm−2, Bm)
m−1⊕
k=2
Bm ∗Bm−1 ∗ . . . ∗Bk+1 ∗ gk(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bk−2, Bk),
where gk(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bk−2, Bk) = fk(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bk−2, Bk, d = 0) ⊕ fk(RA, B1, B2, . . . , Bk−2, Bk, d = 1).
Note that since H0 ∧H1 =⇒ K we have Pr[H0 ∧H1] ≤ Pr[K].
To bound Pr[K] note that the right-hand side contains exactly m terms, but each of them depends on (m− 1) B’s;
none of the terms depends on all B’s simultaneously. The terms corresponding to 2 ≤ k ≤ m− 1 have some internal
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structure (e.g. the dependence on Bm is not arbitrary) but we can relax the problem to the case where the k term is
an arbitrary function of all the B’s except for Bk denoted by hk. The winning condition for the relaxed game is
B1 ∗B2 ∗ . . . ∗Bm =
m⊕
k=1
hk(B[m]\{k})
and clearly the winning probability is an upper bound on Pr[K]. In Section B.2 we define the optimal winning
probability for this game to be ωm. This concludes the proof since
p0 + p1 ≤ 1 + Pr[K] ≤ 1 + ωm.
Note that a non-trivial upper bound on ωm (for an arbitrary m) can be obtained using a recursive argument
presented in Section B.4.
